Romzek, Barbara S. and Melvin J. Dubnick, “Accountability in the public sector: lessons from the Challenger tragedy,” PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW 47 (3), 1987:227-238.
Abstract: The Rogers Commission investigation of the space shuttle Challenger accident was too narrow in its focus; an institutional analysis is needed to supplement the concentration on technical and managerial causes of the tragedy. Using an institutional perspective, we contend that the accident was, in part, a manifestation of NASA’s efforts to manage the diverse expectations it faces in the American political system. Four types of accountability (legal, political, bureaucratic, and professional) are commonly used by public agencies to manage expectations of them. Yet, the presence of multiple accountability systems is not without costs. This case study shows that many of NASA ‘s technical and managerial problems resulted from efforts to respond to legitimate institutional demands. Specifically, we contend that the pursuit of political and bureaucratic accountability distracted NASA from its strength: professional standards and mechanisms of accountability. Furthermore, agency reforms now being implemented and considered compound trends away from the professional accountability approaches used by NASA during the 1960s. Such reforms are just as likely to exacerbate the dilemmas facing NASA as they are to improve the agency’s performance.
Author’s Note:
Winner of the 1987 Mosher Award for Best PAR Article of the Year, this widely cited article laid the foundation for the study of accountability in the field for the decades that followed. It was also noted as among the most influential in the publication’s history. It is one of several articles published during our collaboration from 1986 to 1993.
AI-Generated Summary:
This document analyzes the institutional and accountability factors contributing to the Challenger disaster within NASA and the broader public sector.
Institutional Factors in NASA’s Challenger Disaster
- The Rogers Commission focused mainly on technical and managerial causes, neglecting institutional influences.
- An institutional perspective highlights how NASA’s efforts to manage diverse expectations contributed to the accident.
Types of Public Accountability Systems
- Four accountability systems exist: bureaucratic, legal, professional, and political, each managing expectations differently.
- NASA’s shift from professional to bureaucratic and political accountability mechanisms reflected changing institutional pressures.
Evolution of NASA’s Organizational Accountability
- Early NASA relied on professional accountability emphasizing technical expertise and internal trust.
- Over time, political and bureaucratic pressures increased, leading to decentralization and reliance on contractors, reducing professional control.
Impact of Political and Bureaucratic Pressures
- Political accountability grew as NASA sought support from Congress and the public, especially during shuttle program development.
- Budget cuts and resource constraints shifted NASA toward bureaucratic and political accountability, affecting safety and decision-making.
Technical and Organizational Changes Over Time
- Early NASA prioritized technical excellence with minimal political influence, fostering innovation.
- Later, institutional pressures led to decentralization, contractor reliance, and increased bureaucratic control, impacting safety standards.
The Challenger Case and Institutional Accountability
- Evidence shows NASA’s leadership managed expectations through various accountability systems before Challenger.
- The shift toward bureaucratic and political accountability contributed to decision-making failures that led to the disaster.
Shift from Professional to Bureaucratic Accountability
- NASA’s focus shifted from professional expertise to hierarchical, bureaucratic systems.
- This change increased risks of miscommunication and decision-making based on incomplete data.
Political Pressures Influencing NASA Decisions
- External pressures from White House, Congress, and media pushed NASA to meet ambitious launch schedules.
- These pressures compromised safety attitudes and led to streamlining safety reporting processes.
Organizational Culture and Management Failures
- NASA’s management structure allowed safety concerns to bypass key decision-makers.
- Lower-level managers often concealed problems to avoid jeopardizing schedules or relationships.
Impact of Bureaucratic System on Safety Failures
- Hierarchical accountability caused engineers’ concerns about O-rings and weather to be ignored.
- Critical technical issues were not communicated upward, contributing to the Challenger disaster.
Post-Accident Reforms and Institutional Pressures
- Reforms aimed to increase legal and bureaucratic oversight, including independent safety bodies.
- These measures risk further distancing NASA from technical expertise, emphasizing formal accountability.
Challenges of Returning to Professional Accountability
- Proposals to reintroduce expert-based decision-making face institutional resistance.
- Increased reliance on legal and bureaucratic mechanisms may hinder technical judgment and safety.
Overall Institutional Dilemma
- NASA’s emphasis on political and bureaucratic accountability was inappropriate for its technical tasks.
- A return to professional accountability is ideal but unlikely due to external pressures and organizational culture.