Dubnick, Melvin J., Jonathan B. Justice and Domonic A. Bearfield, “Imagining and Managing Organizational Evil.” In The Foundations Of Organizational Evil , edited by Carole L. Jurkiewicz. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2012: Chapter 8.
Abstract: In this chapter, we argue that organizational evil (OE) is, at the same time, a fundamentally nonsensical idea and a concern of real importance for those studying or leading organizations. Nonsensical, we believe, because the senses in which the expression “organizational evil” is typically used—to describe a property or characteristic of organizations generally or a form of conduct perpetrated by particular organizations—do not correspond in any meaningful way to actual social or natural phenomena. Genuinely important, however, because the use of the language is subjectively meaningful, and therefore consequential and actionable for a wide range of actors in (and concerned with) organizations. The chapter is organized into three major sections. First, we make the case that, because organizations and evil are both quintessentially social facts (see Searle, 1995) with no existence independent of their social context, the common ways of speaking about organizational evil as a thing in-and-of-itself (i.e., existing independently of the volition and actions of individuals) are largely nonsensical. Yet organizational evil understood as a contextually contingent, functional social construct is, in fact, a socially meaningful concept. Next, we explore how that understanding helps us to make sense of the very real ways in which scholars, managers, and laypeople respond to acts and actors that seem so egregiously bad as to be morally incomprehensible. Developing a typology of expressive as well as instrumental reactions to perceived evil acts and actors associated with organizations allows us to categorize some familiar historical cases and to see how certain types of reactions can have either destructive or constructive consequences. Finally, we conclude by noting paradoxically that so-called organizational evil, if properly understood, may (if also properly managed or accommodated) be functionally beneficial, serving to promote constructive moral vigilance and correction among an organization’s members and other stakeholders. We offer as both tentative prescription and research hypothesis the central claim that the ordinary practical ethical reasoning employed by nonsociopaths in their daily life provides a firm underlying basis for the prevention, detection, and correction of actions that would be regarded as organizational evil. This can fruitfully be nurtured by organizations’ leaders, with any tradeoffs of individual ethical empowerment against efficiency and obedience adapted to the circumstances of specific organizations and tasks. Moreover, because ethical reasoning is a learned skill, it can also be further developed in specific organizational environments and task contexts and for specific members of organizations, in appropriate degrees.
AI-Generated Summary:
This document explores the conceptual, social, and philosophical understanding of organizational evil, emphasizing its nature as a social construct and its implications for organizational research and leadership.
Nature of Organizational Evil
- Organizational evil (OE) is a social construct, not an independent entity, and its language is often nonsensical.
- Understanding OE as a socially meaningful, context-dependent concept helps manage reactions and responses.
Ontological Perspectives on OE
- OE can be viewed as metaphysically real (existing outside social cognition) or as a social construct (dependent on perception).
- The chapter favors OE as a social construct, emphasizing its contingent, culturally embedded nature.
Types of Organizational Evil Perspectives
- Four perspectives: pure metaphysical evil, organizations as instruments of evil persons, organizations creating evil acts/actors, and perceived constructed evil.
- The social construct view (Type D) is prioritized for empirical study and understanding OE’s social functions.
Social Construction of Evil and Responses
- Evil attribution involves labeling acts or actors as evil, which can lead to demonization, relabeling, or recasting.
- Responses include moral panics, stigmatization, and processes like delabeling or relabeling to modify perceptions.
Demonization and Moral Panics
- Demonization links acts and actors as inherently wicked, often leading to moral panics and folk devil creation.
- Examples include racism and incidents like Sherrod’s case, where media and social reactions amplify perceptions of evil.
Attribution Processes and Social Reactions
- Responses to perceived evil include judgment, condemnation, and sanctions.
- Labeling influences organizational perceptions and actions, potentially escalating or mitigating conflict.
Implications for Managing OE
- Recognizing OE as a social construct allows leaders to anticipate reactions and manage responses constructively.
- Proper understanding can promote moral vigilance and correction within organizations.
Key Theoretical Foundations
- The chapter draws on philosophical debates about reality, emphasizing pragmatic realism over metaphysical realism.
- It highlights the importance of social context and collective cognition in shaping perceptions of OE.
The Danger of Moral Panics and Quick Judgments
- Moral panics often lead to demonization before all facts are known, risking unjust punishment.
- The Sherrod case exemplifies how edited videos can distort context, causing wrongful demonization.
Constructing and Managing Evil Perceptions
- Evil in organizations is a social construct, not an inherent reality, shaped by perceptions and responses.
- Strategies include relabeling acts or actors to make sense of perceived evil without excusing or criminalizing them.
Relabeling as a Response to Organizational Evil
- One approach views evil-doers as thoughtless agents operating under an agentic state, bearing moral responsibility.
- An alternative sees actors as victims of circumstances, entering a “gray zone” where morality collapses and judgment is complex.
The Gray Zone and Conceptions of Moral Complexity
- Levi’s “gray zone” describes individuals who commit wicked acts but are also victims, complicating moral judgment.
- Experiments like Milgram’s obedience study and Zimbardo’s Stanford Prison Experiment show ordinary people can commit evil under organizational roles.
Transformation of Evil Through Recasting
- Recasting involves delabeling, neutralizing, or criminalizing evil acts to reduce their unfathomability.
- Delabeling removes the evil label; neutralization offsets stigma; criminalization makes acts legally punishable.
The Paradox of Recasting Evil
- Efforts to neutralize or criminalize evil aim to undermine its unfathomable power by transforming it into something manageable.
- These processes can either diminish or inadvertently reinforce perceptions of evil depending on context.
Organizational Evil as a Social Construct
- Organizational evil is not an independent entity but a social construct based on stakeholder beliefs.
- Responses to perceived evil can range from harmful moral panics to beneficial ethical reforms.
Developing Ethical Reasoning to Prevent Evil
- Encouraging ethical reasoning among members can reduce the likelihood of evil acts.
- Balancing ethical judgment with obedience requires leadership that fosters ethical competence and independent thinking.
The Role of Accountability and Ethical Development
- Accountability mechanisms help organizations preempt evil behaviors by monitoring and sanctioning misconduct.
- Building ethical competence at all levels promotes responsible decision-making and reduces reliance on blind obedience.
Practical Implications for Organizational Leadership
- Leaders should promote ethical reasoning and independent judgment over mere compliance.
- Developing practical wisdom and ethical skills can help organizations better manage perceived evil and prevent harmful actions.